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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans buy a lot of liability insurance. According to
one recent study, annual premiums exceed $75 billion, or almost
two percent of our gross domestic product When we buy such
insurance, we are essentially buying two things. First, we are buy-
ing a right to have the insurance company pay any liability we may
be found to have for acts covered in the policy, up to the policy's
face amount and in excess of its deductible. Second, we buy the
right to have the insurance company pay for our legal defense
against the claimed liability.
t Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, The
George Washington University Law School. A version of this Article was presented
as the 1996 Pirsig Lecture at William Mitchell College of Law on April 11, 1996.
1. See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1629, 1629 (1994) (explaining why insurers and attorneys, with the cooperation
and encouragement of legal and political institutions, have successfully driven
people to over-consume liability insurance).
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In addition to payment of our premiums, the insurance
company has a right to expect at least two things from us. First is
prompt notice of the event that may produce a claim; prompt no-
tice allows the insurer to investigate the event and prepare the de-
fense. Second is cooperation in helping to minimize liability by
providing the company with information about the incident and
by not trying to settle the case personally.
In the majority of potential liability cases, lawyers are not in-
volved. Insurance companies use non-lawyer adjusters to estimate
likely liability and seek a release from persons to whom the in-
sured might be found liable in exchange for a cash payment of
less than the policy limits.
In other cases, however, the plaintiff may use a lawyer to file
or threaten to file a complaint, and the defendant will need
someone to file an answer. A lawyer will be retained by the insur-
ance company pursuant to the company's duty to defend its in-
sured. Again, in the majority of such cases, the insurer and in-
sured will have identical interests in disposing of the matter
quickly and at the lowest possible cost.
At minimum, the lawyer retained by the defense represents
the insured. It is the insured on whose behalf the lawyer will en-
ter an appearance in the case. The question considered in this
article is whether the lawyer also represents the insurance com-
pany as a co-client with the insured. Alternatively, is the insurance
company simply an entity with a contractual duty to pay for the
defense?'
2. Indeed, the insured is likely to be the only named party because the very
fact of insurance coverage is usually studiously suppressed. One issue testing
whom the lawyer really represents is whom the lawyer is barred from suing because
of their current client status. In McCourt Co. v. FPC Properties, Inc., a lawyer filed
suit on behalf of a client against the opponent. 434 N.E.2d 1234 (Mass. 1982).
The lawyer had been retained by the opponent's insurer to represent the oppo-
nent concurrently in an unrelated matter. Id. at 1236. The court concluded that
both opponent and insurer were the lawyer's clients. Id. Thus, the lawyer could
not be the one to sue the opponent on behalf of the client. Id. at 1238; see also
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 822 (1965) (stating that if a law-
yer represents an insured under a reservation of rights, the lawyer may not later
help the insurer prove there was no liability coverage); cf. Moritz v. Medical Protec-
tive Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 874 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (explaining that the insured was a
client of the lawyer retained by an insurance company in a prior matter, but be-
cause the two matters were not substantially related, the lawyer's current represen-
tation against the insured was not barred).
3. One answer to that question might be derived from cases deciding
whether the lawyer could file an unrelated action against the insurance company,
[Vol. 23
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The question of whom the lawyer represents in such cases is
not new. It was implicit in articles written by Professor (now
Judge) Robert Keeton beginning more than forty years ago.4 But
it has been raised again with unusual intensity in response to pub-
lication of a recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers.5
The proposed final draft of the Restatement, first considered
by American Law Institute (ALI) members in May 1996, deals
with the lawyer retained by an insurance company to represent its
insured. Section 215, "Compensation and Direction by Third
Person," states:
something it could not do if the insurer were a current client. In Gray v. Commer-
cial Union Insurance Co., a lawyer represented the plaintiff against an insurance
company in a case for wrongful discharge. 468 A.2d 721 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1983). For 20 years, the lawyer had been retained by the insurance company to
defend policyholders in personal injury cases. Id. at 723. The insurer alleged that
the lawyer gave access to "confidential and proprietary information" such as how
the company handled claims and litigation. Id.
The court said there was "no dispute" that the lawyer had "maintained an at-
torney-client relationship" with the insurance company. Id. at 724-25. "He owes to
each a duty to preserve the confidences and secrets imparted to him during the
course of representation." Id. at 725. During his 20 years of work on insurance
cases, the lawyer had access to enough of the company's secrets that there was a
"substantial relationship" between this case and prior work. Id. The prior cases
made lawyer aware of the personnel policies about which the plaintiff complained.
Id.
The basis of the court's opinion was more than protection of confidences. See
id. at 726. The court also noted that a lawyer may not sue one of his or her pres-
ent clients, even in unrelated matters. Id. One of the personal injury cases was
still outstanding, so the court said the insurance company was still the lawyer's cli-
ent. Id. at 723. Indeed, the court said the lawyer could not represent the wrongful
discharge plaintiff even with the insurance company's consent. Id. at 728; cf In-
surance Co. of N. Am. v. Westergren, 794 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. App. 1990) (stat-
ing that the lawyer expressly undertook to make the indemnity insurer a client).
4. See generally Robert E. Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against Iis Li-
ability Insurer, 13 VAND. L. REv. 837 (1960); Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance
and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1136 (1954); Robert E. Keeton,
Preferential Settlement of Liability-Insurance Claims, 70 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1956) (ex-
plaining in all three articles the potential problem or conflict that can arise when a
lawyer is provided to the insured by an insurance company which may have diver-
gent interests).
5. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 215
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). This Restatement has been a decade-long
project of the American Law Institute and is designed to collect and organize nu-
merous principles with legal force that regulate the practice of law. Professor
Charles W. Wolfram of Cornell Law School serves as Chief Reporter; Professor
John Leubsdorf of Rutgers (Newark) Law School and the author of this Article
serve as Associate Reporters.
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(1) A lawyer may not represent a client under circum-
stances in which someone other than the client will
wholly or partially compensate the lawyer for the
representation, unless the client consents ... with
knowledge of the circumstances and conditions of
the payment.
(2) A lawyer's professional conduct on behalf of a cli-
ent may be directed by someone other than the
client if:
(a) the direction is reasonable in scope and char-
acter, such as by reflecting obligations borne
by the person directing the lawyer; and
(b) the client consents to the direction .... 
Section 215 applies to more than the insurance relation-
ship. It applies to the lawyer paid by a corporation to represent
an employee, for example, or to a lawyer paid by parents to rep-
resent their child. Comment f of section 215 applies specifically
to the insurance situation, providing:
The lawyer represents the insured. The insurer is
not, simply by the fact that it designates a lawyer, a cli-
ent of the lawyer. Regardless of [w]hether a client-
lawyer relationship also exists .... communications be-
tween the lawyer and representatives of the insured
concerning such matters as progress reports, case
evaluations, and settlement are communications with
an agent of the client [and thus privileged]. Similarly,
because and to the extent that the insurer is directly
concerned in the matter financially, the insurer has
standing to assert a claim for appropriate relief from
the lawyer for financial loss proximately caused by pro-
fessional negligence or other wrongful act of the law-
7yer....
This proposal has elicited an apoplectic response from the
insurance industry, primarily led by law professors acting as con-
sultants to the industry. Asserting that the only correct view is
that defense counsel simultaneously represents the insured and
the insurer, the Restatement's critics have equated the Reporters
with "politicians seeking votes [who] have incentives to distort
6. Id.
7. Id. cmt. f.
[Vol. 23
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss1/11
WHOSE LA WYER ARE YOU ANYWA Y?
the truth."8 In some of the kinder references, the Restatement
analysis has been said to be "conceptually impoverished,"9 re-
quiring practices that "torture the insured."0 The authors of
these attacks call upon the defense bar to "sack the entire [Re-
statement] project [rather] than to permit it to become final in
its present form.""
This Article will not try to match the rhetorical fervor of the
industry, but it will try to explain why the Reporters have chosen
the approach we have. In brief, I will argue that the abstract de-
bate about whether an insurance defense lawyer has one client orS 12
two is ultimately unproductive. In the first place, binary distinc-
tions between clients and non-clients ultimately prove inadequate
in talking about the tripartite relationships between an insurance
company, an insured, and a retained defense lawyer.13
8. Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, Wrong Turns on the Three Way Street:
Dispelling Nonsense About Insurance Defense Lawyers, COVERAGE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 1,
1.
9. Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, Are Liability Carriers Second-Class Cli-
ents? No, But They May Be Soon - A Call to Arms Against the Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers, COVERAGE, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 21, 39.
10. Id. at 38.
11. Id. at 39. The ALI membership voted in May 1996 to send section 215
back to the Reporters to try to reach an acceptable compromise with its critics.
The issues are expected to come before the ALI membership next in May 1998.
12. Of the cases using the one-client or two-client language, more treat the
insured as a second client. Those cases did not turn on the two-client characteri-
zation, and a one-client approach represents a clearer way to think about the out-
comes.
13. Among the leading articles on the tripartite relationship are Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 15 (1987), and John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 825 (1992).
Articles addressing the one-client/two-client problem in the context of in-
surance defense include Karen 0. Bowdre, Conflicts of Interest Between Insurer and
Insured: Ethical Traps for the Unsuspecting Defense Counsel, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 101
(1993); Sharon K. Hall, Confusion Over Conflicts of Interest: Is There a Bright Line for
Insurance Defense Counsel, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 731 (1992); Ronald E. Mallen, A New
Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, 53 INS. COUNS. J. 108 (1986); Ronald E. Mal-
len, Insurance Counsel: The Fine Line Between Professional Responsibility and Malpractice,
45 INS. COUNS. J. 244 (1978); John K. Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under
Liability Insurance Policies: A Proposed Solution, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 457 (1981); Rich-
ard L. Neumeier, Serving Two Masters: Problems Facing Insurance Defense Counsel and
Some Proposed Solutions, 77 MASS. L. REV. 66 (1992); Charles Silver, Does Insurance
Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1583 (1994);
Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense
Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255 (1995); and Brooke Wunnicke, The Eternal Triangle: Stan-
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Because the characterization seems to make a difference, I
will be discussing five aspects: (1) selection of the lawyer, (2) di-
recting the defense, (3) settling cases, (4) keeping communi-
cations privileged, and (5) the right to sue for malpractice. I
conclude that the conflict questions are greater, not lesser, when
the insurance company and the insured are considered as co-
clients in a case.
II. THE RIGHT TO SELECT DEFENSE COUNSEL
One of the seemingly least controversial issues in the rela-
tionship between insurer and insured - the right to select de-
fense counsel - is the first testing case for the "one client or two"
dispute.
The basic rule of law is clear. When the insured refers a mat-
ter to an insurance company for defense, the company gets to
pick the lawyer. In In re Preferred Accident Insurance Co., the insurer
not only selected counsel to provide defense, it later substituted
new counsel without the consent of, and without even providing
notice to, the insured. 4 The court held the insurance company
was within its right when it did this.'5 That is what most policies
provide and, after all, the insurance company is the one paying
the lawyer's bill.
In a simple case where the insurer and insured share an in-
terest in resolving the matter within policy limits, the insurance
company has a right to keep costs down, use lawyers with whom it
has had good experience, or both. Indeed, insurance companies
increasingly have been assigning salaried lawyers, employed by
the insurance company, to represent their insureds.
14. 78 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (App. Div. 1948).
15. Id. (holding that "such implied authority included the power to change
lawyers"); see also Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 871 (W.D. Wis.
1977) (stating that the relationship between the insured and the attorney is cho-
sen by the insurer); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal
Op. 282 (1950) (stating an attorney may accept employment by an insurance
company to handle an insured's claim without the request or approval of the in-
sured).
16. See, e.g., In 7e Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322, 332 (Tenn. 1995) (reviewing
and setting aside Formal Ethics Op. 93-F-132). The Tennessee court said:
The employment of an attorney by an insurer to represent the insured
does not create the relationship of attorney-client between the insurer
and the attorney, nor does that employment necessarily impose upon the
attorney any duty or loyalty to the insurer which impairs the attorney-
client relationship between the attorney and the insured or impedes the
[Vol. 23
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Apparently one reason this issue has become so important to
defenders of the two-client model is that in the traditional state-
ment of the rule in Restatement section 215, when one person
pays another's legal fees, the retained lawyer may not take the
case unless the non-paying client consents to the arrangement
with an understanding of the conflicts of interest that could
arise. 7 On the other hand, if insurer and insured are co-clients,
the argument goes, the lawyer and insurer do not need the in-
sured's consent. It is interesting to note that the consent re-
quirement of the general conflicts provision in Rule 1.7(b) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct is not triggered until "the
representation of a client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests."'8 Model Rule 1.8(f), on the other hand,
requires consent whenever a third party pays the bill, whether any
limitation on the representation is foreseeable.'9
The insurance industry's belief that the two-client model will
simplify its handling of cases seems to stem, at least somewhat,
from its desire to avoid seeking consent. The industry argues that
in the majority of cases that settle quickly and within policy limits,
the insured does not need to know whether counsel was ap-
pointed, much less to consent to that appointment.
I do not disagree with that practical argument. The argu-
ment, however, has little to do with the one-client/two-client dis-
tinction. The requirements in Model Rule 1.8(f) are not sus-
performance of legal services for the insured by the attorney.
Id. at 328. The court continued: "The same loyalty is owed the client whether the
attorney is employed and paid by the client, is a salaried employee of the insurer,
or is an independent contractor engaged by the insurer. Compliance with the
Code in all cases will be measured against the Code itself.. . ." Id.; see also In re All-
state Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 953 (Mo. 1987); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 282 (1950). However, the companies' right to use
employed lawyers is not universally recognized. See, e.g., American Ins. Ass'n v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ky. 1996); Gardner v. North Carolina
State Bar, 341 S.E.2d 517, 523 (N.C. 1986).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 215; see also MODEL RuLES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (1995) ("A lawyer shall not accept compensa-
tion for representing a client from one other than the client unless... the client
consents after consultation."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-
107(A) (1981) ("Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not. .. [a]ccept compensation for his legal services from one other than his
client.").
18. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1991).
19. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (1) (1991).
1997]
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pended when one of two co-clients pays the legal expenses of the
other. Unless one adopts the dubious fiction that the insurance
company is paying the lawyer for representing it alone, while the
lawyer represents the insured pro bono, the two-client model it-
self triggers the requirement of consent in Rule 1.8(f). Alterna-
tively, even if one did assume the lawyer were representing two
entities, only one of whom is paying for the service, the situation
would almost by definition present a potential conflict that would
trigger the consent requirement of Model Rule 1.7(b).
Indeed, the only useful way to deal with the consent di-
lemma is to make consent practical to acquire. Restatement sec-
tion 215 proposes that insurance policy provisions explain to in-
sured persons that the insurance company will select defense
counsel, if counsel is necessary, and that tendering the case to
the company for defense constitutes a consent to the company's
right to select counsel. The insured, after all, can decide to use
his or her own lawyer if the insured is willing to forego liability
coverage. The suggested approach does not provide the per-
sonal explanation from the lawyer required by Rule 1.8(f), but it
should suffice in the typical case where the interests of insurer
and insured seem to be aligned.
III. DIRECTION OF THE DEFENSE
A client may direct the lawyer's conduct of a case. Lawyers
do not ask their clients about matters such as when to object to a
question at trial, but a client can direct the case by preventing
the lawyer from asserting certain defenses, deciding whether the
client will take the stand, and certainly by deciding whether to
settle a case. Some of the most important disputes between in-
surers and their insureds arise around these issues.
A. Deciding What Defenses to Raise
Reynolds v. Maramorosch illustrates the problem.2 0 The in-
sured was sued by his minor sons for injuries suffered in an auto
accident. 2' The lawyers retained by the father's insurance com-
pany to conduct the defense filed a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint under a doctrine that said children lack capacity to sue."
20. 144 N.Y.S.2d 900 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1955).
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At that point, the father hired his own lawyer and submitted an
affidavit stating that the motion had been filed without his
knowledge or consent.2' He wanted to waive the capacity to sue
defense.
The issue thus became who, insurer or insured, could decide
what defenses would be interposed.25  The court ruled that the
decision ultimately resided with the insured.26 So long as the law-
yer represented the insured, the lawyer could not take an action
"against the express wish of the client.., no matter how appro-
priate it may be."27
As a practical matter, of course, decisions about which de-
fenses to raise are typically left to the insurance company, both
because of its experience defending countless cases and because
of the insured's contractual duty to cooperate in the effort to
minimize liability. Recognizing the insurance company's contrac-
tual rights, however, did not turn it into the lawyer's client. "It
may well be that the defendant Reynolds has been ill-advised," the
court said "[H] e may incur needless expense and find himself
without the insurance coverage which he purchased. That, how-
ever, is his responsibility and one which he has the right to assume
if he sees fit, regardless of the lack of sound judgment involved."
29
23. Id.
24. Id. at 903.
25. See id. at 903-04.
26. Reynolds, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05.
27. Id. at 904.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 904-05. An interesting application of this principle is illustrated by
Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v. Color Converting Industries Co., 45 E3d 1170 (7th Cir.
1995). The insured corporation voluntarily paid $200,000 to settle a claim from a
valued customer when the insured's ink ruined the customer's packaging. Id. at
1171. The insurance company refused to acknowledge the insured's liability and
refused to indemnify the insured, citing a violation of the "voluntary payments"
clause of the policy. Id. at 1172. The insured charged the insurer with acting in
bad faith, which would bar reliance on that clause. See id. at 1173. The customer
had refused to turn certain records over to the insurer to assist its investigation of
the claim. Id. at 1172. The insurer refused to use industry average cost figures as a
sufficient measure of the loss. Id. When negotiations were at an impasse, the in-
sured simply paid the customer for the loss suffered. Id.
Writing for the court, Judge Posner stated that nothing in the law requires an
insurer to minimize an insured's business risk, as opposed to liability risk. Id. Only
if liability is clear and payment slow, or if the insurer refuses to defend, is the
threshold of bad faith met. Id. The court acknowledged cases holding that an in-
surer must defend a case so as to minimize the risk of an excess judgment against
the insured. Id. That was not an issue in Charter Oak, however, because the claim
was well below policy limits. Id. The only real risk for the insured here was that it
1997]
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Even a legitimate concern about the problem of collusion is
not enough to change the lawyer's obligation. In Montanez v. Ifi-
zarry-Rodriguz, a wife had sued her husband for injuries she sus-
tained in a car accident.0 Originally they had filed a products li-
ability action, claiming the tire had blown out, but when the
physical evidence did not support that story, the wife argued that
her husband had been negligent. 1 When the husband took the
witness stand, called by the lawyer retained to defend him by the
insurance company, he confirmed his wife's story. 3' Thereupon,
the lawyer asked the judge for the right to cross-examine the hus-
band as a hostile witness. He also said he would call as a rebuttal
witness the insurance investigator who took the husband's state-
ment.34 The trial judge allowed the lawyer to attack the husband's
credibility, and the jury found no liability.
35
On review, the Montanez court followed the majority rule that
a lawyer provided by an insurer cannot impeach his own client.
36
might lose a customer; the insurer did not contract to bear that risk. See id. at
1173.
When the customer in Charter Oak saw it had the upper hand, it made it hard
for the insurer to get information. Id. at 1174. An insured would have incentive
to collude with a customer if it could require the insurer to bear all the conse-
quences of settlement. Id. It is not enough to say insured's settlement must be
reasonable; the contract did not give the insured the right to settle at all. Id. at
1173. Even a rule that would say an insurer is required to settle whenever the in-
sured would do so would go too far. See id. at 1176. An insured might settle
groundless claims simply to make customers happy. See id. An insurer does not
have to assume the risk such an approach would entail. Id.
In another case, the insured and his wife, the plaintiff, had moved from the
jurisdiction. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 577, 578 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1979). The insurer defended and got the case dismissed because the defendant
could not be served at his new address. Id. at 582. The husband argued this de-
fense was inconsistent with his interest in helping his wife prevail and that failure
to warn him of the defense represented bad faith by the insurer. Id. at 582-83.
However, the court reasoned that "when an attorney is retained to represent both
the insured and the insurer... a potential conflict between the interests of the
two parties may arise. In such a case, the primary duty is to further the best inter-
ests of the policyholder." Id. at 582 (citing Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins., 320 P.2d 140
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)). Here, the best interests of the defendant were to get
the case dismissed; his interest in collusion need not be recognized by counsel. Id.
at 583.
30. 641 A.2d 1079, 1079 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
31. Id. at 1080.
32. Id. at 1081-82.
33. Id. at 1081.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 1082.
36. See Montanez, 641 A.2d at 1083 (relying upon Crothers v. Caroselli, 20 A.2d
[Vol. 23
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The court reasoned that the insured's impeachment is only rele-
vant to an issue between the insured and the insurer.3 7 "Nothing
can be more devastating to an insured than to have his or her
credibility challenged by assigned insurance counsel. In this case,
77 (N.J. 1941), in which the insurer also had tried to impeach the witness where
collusion was suspected). The Montanez court held that the lawyer represents the
party; the insurance carrier was not a party to the case and could not impeach the
witness. Id. If an insurer wants to prove collusion, it has to do so in another forum.
Id.
There are a number of such collusion cases. See, for example, Schwartz v. Sar
Corp., where the plaintiff in an accident case was the defendant's uncle, who alleg-
edly was hit when the car came over a curb. 195 N.YS.2d 496, 497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 195 N.YS.2d 819 (N.Y App. Div. 1959). The insurance
company thought the suit was collusive, and the lawyer retained by the company
moved to dismiss and filed an affidavit saying he thought the accident had never
happened. Id. at 498-99. On review, the court found the affidavit inadequate to
defeat summaryjudgment on liability, saying:
The lawyer may not take up the cudgels of this insurance carrier, when its
interests are diametrically opposed to the interests of the assured. A law-
yer who represents a client is required to do so wholeheartedly and with
full determination to assert his client's cause and to protect his rights.
He is not required to participate in or to help in perpetrating a fraud,
and if he is satisfied that his client is so conducting himself, it is his duty
as an officer of the court to withdraw as counsel. He may not, however,
take up the defense of one upon whom the fraud is sought to be prac-
ticed, particularly where he has already received the confidence of his
client....
The court may not close its eyes to the obvious. The prime interest
of these attorneys is the insurance company, in whose behalf they defend
many cases year after year. Where the interests of the carrier and the cli-
ent run parallel with each other, the attorneys undoubtedly will exert
their best efforts to protect the interests of their client, since in so doing,
they will also be protecting the interests of their real principal. But
where, as in this case, the interests are adverse one to the other, then the
attorneys may not assist the lost traveler along the road and at the same
time prepare a trap into which he will ultimately fall.
Id. at 503 (internal quotation omitted).
The insurer was held to a strict duty of good faith. Id. at 504. There are not
two standards, one applicable to private counsel and one to lawyers paid by an in-
surance company. Id. "If the interests of the carrier and the assured are or are
likely to become diverse, [the lawyer] cannot represent both." Id. at 505. The
court ultimately held that the insured should be permitted to retain a lawyer at the
expense of the insurer. Id. Thus, summary judgment for the plaintiff was re-
versed, and the right to defend on both liability and damages was given. Id.
In contrast, the defense lawyer in Christie v. Eager was permitted to introduce
evidence that there was insurance and evidence of the relationship between plain-
tiff and defendant. 26 A.2d 352, 353 (Conn. 1942). The court said it went to the
credibility of the insured's current story in relation to the statement he had signed
earlier claiming no negligence. Id. at 354.
37. Montanez, 641 A.2d at 1083.
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defendant was left essentially defenseless to his attorney's attack
on his credibility."3 The lawyer could have sought to withdraw,
and the insurer could have refused to pay the judgment, but in
these instances the insured could have sued the insurer and the
insurer could have made the defense of non-cooperation or col-
lusion in that proceeding. 39 The court held that at least when the
interests of the insurer and the insured differ, the lawyer's client is
the insured, not the insurance company. The judgment was re-
versed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.
B. The Breadth of the Duty to Defend
A large part of the issue about whom the lawyer represents is
created by the difference in scope between the insurer's duty to
defend and its duty to indemnify the insured. For example, if an
insured person is sued both for negligently injuring the plaintiff,
and alternatively for intentionally doing so, an insurer typically
will acknowledge coverage of the negligence claim. Most policies,
however, have an exclusion expressly denying coverage for an in-
sured's intentional torts.
The fact that an insurance company may not be liable for a
judgment does not mean the company will not have a duty to fi-
nance the insured's defense. In American Employers Insurance Co. v.
Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., a boat was lost at sea with many casu-
alties and claims well in excess of policy limits. 41 The insurer
asked the court to allow the insurer to pay the coverage limit and
38. Id. at 1084.
39. See id. at 1085.
40. Id.; see also Friedman v. Berkowitz, 136 N.YS.2d 81 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1954). In
Friedman, the defendant obligingly testified that he had indeed negligently created
a condition that injured his son-in-law. Friedman, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 82. The court
refused to permit the lawyer to impeach the insured, stating, "The lawyer is only
the agent of the client and, so long as he continues in that capacity, he must follow
the directions of his client, and not prolong the litigation to test an issue between
his client and a possible third party." Id. at 83. The court stated that the insurer
must try the collusion issue in another forum. Id.; accord Katz v. Ross, 216 F.2d 880,
885 (3d Cir. 1954) (explaining that a lawyer defending an insured is not permitted
to cross-examine him about his behavior at the time of the accident); Spadaro v.
Palmisano, 109 So. 2d 418, 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that issues of
fraud and collusion must be tried in a separate proceeding); Gass v. Carducci, 185
N.E.2d 285, 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) (stating that Illinois follows the majority rule)
("Insurance counsel may not impeach his client, the insured, for the benefit of his
employer, an insurance company not a party to the suit.").
41. 131 N.YS.2d 393, 396-97 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1954).
[Vol. 23
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avoid any duty to defend the lawsuits, but the court refused.42
The duty to defend is not subordinate to the duty to indemnify.4 s
It is a separate benefit for the insured, not just a way for the in-
surer to avoid liability of its own. 44 The court asserted, "The prin-
ciple that 'the duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay' is
now beyond cavil. 4 ' The complaints were sufficient to allege a
covered event, so the insurer had a duty to defend regardless of
46the degree to which it ultimately bore the losses.
Similarly, in Farmers Insurance Co. v. Vagnozzi, the insured
knocked another player to the ground during an informal bas-
ketball game. 7 If the act was intentional, it was not covered by
policy; if it was an accident, it was covered. 4 Again, the insurance
company sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to de-
fend.49 And again, the court refused to let the insurer avoid the
obligation.5 0  The blow was intentional in the sense that both
players voluntarily participated in a rough basketball game, but
the incident clearly was different from slugging someone on the
street.5' The only way to decide whether the blow was intentional
42. Id.
43. See id. at 401.
44. See id. at 399.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 401; see also Prashker v. United States Guar. Co., 136 N.E.2d 871, 875
(N.Y. 1956) (stating that the insurer's liability for the cost of a defense must await
proof at trial as to the cause of the accident).
47. 675 P.2d 703, 703 (Ariz. 1983).
48. See id. at 704.
49. Id. at 705.
50. Id.; see also Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 539 E
Supp. 1295, 1304 (D. Md. 1982) (forcing insurer to defend suit accusing insured
employees of stealing ticket revenues); All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 E
Supp. 160, 161 (N.D. Ind. 1971) (enforcing insurer's duty to defend against suit by
bar patron even though incident occurred after closing time); Gray v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 419 P.2d 168, 178 (Cal. 1966) (stating whether act be intentional or done in
self-defense must await determination at trial); Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264
Minn. 378, 387-88, 119 N.W.2d 703, 709 (1963) (stating that insurer had duty to
defend regardless if the tenant's injury occurred while tenant was acting as em-
ployee); American Home Assurance Co. v. Weissman, 434 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (N.Y.
1981) (stating whether acts done in covered role as attorney or non-covered role
as investment advisor could only be determined after trial); Employers' Fire Ins.
Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397, 402-03 (R.I. 1968) ("[T]he insurer's duty to defend a
suit brought against one of its policyholders is determined by the allegations con-
tained in the complaint. [A] liability insurer's duty to defend is predicated not
upon information in its possession which indicates or even proves non-coverage,
but instead upon the allegations in the complaint filed against the insured.").
51. Vagnozzi, 675 P.2d at 710.
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was to go to trial.52
C. The Conflict of Interest Thus Presented
If the defense provided by the insurance company succeeds
in excusing the insured from all liability to the plaintiff, in most
cases both the insured and the insurer will be happy. That is the
ideal, but not very interesting, objective.
Realistically, the insured often will be found guilty of some-
thing. When one basis of liability will require the insurer to pay
the judgment against the insured, while another basis will require
the insured to pay the judgment alone, it is easy to see that a law-
yer representing the insurer and insured as separate and equal
co-clients faces a serious conflict of interest. To compound the
problem, the lawyer likely will never see the insured again,
whereas the insurance company is a prospective source of many
more legal fees. It is easy to imagine which "client's" interest the
lawyer will have an incentive to favor.
Indeed, the conflict problem is so serious that the insurance
company must announce that its provision of the defense is un-
der a "reservation of rights" if it wants to later have a right to raise
a coverage or policy defense. When such a reservation of rights
is asserted, the insured may either be defended by the insurer's
lawyer or seek separate and independent counsel.
Even if the representation is by the lawyer selected by the in-
surance company, however, it is clear the lawyer's duty is to the in-
52. Id.; see also Transamerica Ins. Group v. Meere, 694 P.2d 181, 187 (Ariz.
1984) (claiming that a blow was struck in self-defense is enough to remove the case
from the intentional act exclusion of the policy); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 347 A.2d 842, 848 (Md. 1975) (stating that insured's guilty plea to criminal
assault was not determinative of whether act was intentional and thus did not
eliminate insurer's duty to defend).
53. See, e.g., Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 394 P.2d 571, 574 (Cal. 1964)
(holding that a lawyer had actual and apparent authority to bind the insurer by his
representation that reservation of rights would not be asserted; thus, the insurer
was estopped from denying coverage); Meirthew v. Last, 135 N.W.2d 353, 355
(Mich. 1965) (failing to reserve rights estops the insurer from asserting policy de-
fense); Perkoski v. Wilson, 92 A.2d 189, 191 (Pa. 1952) ("It was ... incumbent
upon the company to inform its policyholder of its prospective adverse interest
with respect to the extent of its liability under the terms of the policy. [It did not
do that.] Good conscience and fair dealing required that the company pursue a
course that was not advantageous to itself while disadvantageous to its policy-
holder; and, not having so acted, the company was estopped thereafter to the ex-
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sured. One court put the rule this way:
When counsel, although paid by the casualty com-
pany, undertakes to represent the policyholder and files
his notice of appearance, he owes to his client, the as-
sured, an undeviating and single allegiance. His fealty
embraces the requirement to produce in court all wit-
nesses, fact and expert, who are available and necessary
for the proper protection of the rights of his client. It is
immaterial that such procedure increases the cost to
the carrier beyond the policy coverage limit.
54
Alternatively, the insured may select counsel of its own. In
many states, the insurance company must pay the reasonable bill
for that lawyer's services. These principles were described
clearly in San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance So-
ciety.56 The credit union had been sued by a former employee for
wrongful discharge. 5' The plaintiff sought general and punitive
58damages. The insurer agreed to defend all issues, but it ex-
press l reserved coverage questions, especially as to punitive dam-
ages. The credit union hired independent counsel and the issue
60was who must pay the additional expense.
The court noted that typically the insurer and insured have
the same interest in defeating a plaintiff, but it noted that "there
has been recognition that, in reality, the insurer's attorneys may
have closer ties with the insurer and a more compelling interest
54. American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 131
N.Y.S.2d 393, 401 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1954); see also Hammett v. McIntyre, 249 P.2d 885,
892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (granting new trial where law firm had conflict in repre-
senting both insurer and insured in the case).
55. See, e.g., Previews, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir.
1981); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1978);
CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1993);
Executive Aviation, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 355 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. 1976); Prashker v.
United States Guar. Co., 136 N.E.2d 871 (N.Y. 1956). But see American Home As-
surance Co. v. Weissman, 434 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (1981) (allowing insurance com-
pany to control the defense); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397, 404
(R.I. 1968) (entitling insurance company to approve insured's choice of counsel);
cf Goldberg v. American Home Ins. Co., 439 N.Y.S.2d 2, 4 (1981) (stating that
while insurer must pay defense costs, it need not pay for affirmative claims asserted
by the insured).
56. 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
57. Id. at 496.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 497.
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in protecting the insurer's position, whether or not it coincides
with what is best for the insured. 6' The basis of liability may or
may not be found within the terms of the policy. The defense
team would have to make trial decisions that might or might not
benefit the insured. ' The same could be true in settlement talks
and pretrial discovery.3 In cases like this one, the court said, the
lawyer hired by the insurer must tell both insurer and insured the
risks of joint representation.6 If the insured does not agree to
those lawyers continuing in the case, they must cease representing
both the insurer and the insured.65 At that point, the insurer
must pay for insured's counsel and give the insured the right to
66control the litigation.
Thus, on the issue of direction of the defense, in cases where
the only lines of defense are clearly within the terms of the insur-
61. Id. at 498 n.3 (quoting Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524,
534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
62. Cumis, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
63. Id. at 499. The court also saw a problem with the handling of confidential
client information if the lawyer had to represent two clients:
As between counsel's two clients, there is no confidentiality regarding
communications intended to promote common goals. But confidential-
ity is essential where communication can affect coverage. Thus, the law-
yer is forced to walk an ethical tightrope, and not communicate relevant
information which is beneficial to one or the other of his clients.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 500.
66. Id. at 506. California codified the Cumis decision in its civil code, which
summarily provides:
(a) If the policy gives the insurer a duty to defend, the insured must be
given a right to independent counsel.
(b) No conflict of interest shall be deemed to exist as to allegations of
punitive damages or for a demand in excess of policy limits.
(c) An insurer may demand that the insured's counsel be experienced
and carry liability insurance.
(d) The duty of independent counsel must disclose to insurer all rele-
vant material, except that which is privileged.
(e) The insured may waive its right to select independent counsel.
(f) Both insured and insurer's counsel may participate in all aspects of
the litigation and nothing shall lessen the insured's duty to cooper-
ate with insurer.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 1987); see also Employers Ins. v. Albert D. Seeno
Constr. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (implementing Cumis);Jon
R. Mower &James P. Schratz, The Other Side of the Cumis Coin: The Insurer's Ability to
Select Associate Defense Counsel Under Civil Code Section 2860Wo, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV.
569, 573 (1993) (explaining that under California statute, the insurer may select
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ance policy, it really does not matter how one talks about whom
the lawyer represents. Whether one says there is one client or
two, no one's behavior will change. Where policy or coverage de-
fenses are involved, however, it is clear that the lawyer's duty is to
the insured alone. Given that fact, there is no productive reason
not to treat the insured as the client and the insurance company
as a third party paying the bill. Indeed, discussing the relation-
ship any other way can only be misleading.
IV. THE DECISION TO SETTLE
Perhaps the single most important decision for a defendant
in a law suit is deciding when and whether to settle the case. The
cost of continuing to litigate and the risk that a verdict would ex-
ceed the settlement must be balanced against the amount of the
settlement. In a case where a defendant is not insured, that de-
fendant can strike the balance in terms of his or her own inter-
ests.
When insurance is involved, however, the calculation
changes. The cost of continuing to litigate will be borne by the in-
surer alone, as will the cost of any settlement within policy limits.
The risk that a verdict will exceed the face amount of the policy
would be borne by the insured alone. Once again, then - in
many if not most cases - the interests will differ; the conflict of in-
terests is clear.
A. Bad Faith Failure to Settle a Case
The most common way the conflict of interest arises is when
the plaintiff makes an offer to settle the case for a sum equal to or
less than the insured's policy limits. Acceptance of a policy limit
offer would, in most cases, be an unqualified benefit to the in-
sured; the insured's possible liability for a large excess judgment
would be extinguished. The insurer, on the other hand, may
have little to gain by accepting the offer. It may have at stake only
whatever additional litigation costs are foreseeable, whereas there
is always the chance the jury might find the defendant not liable
at all.
For many years, courts have sought to design a rule that
would allow the insurance company to decide whether and when
to settle, but that would require the insurer to apply an equitable
standard. For example, in Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance
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Co., plaintiffs were struck by an insured truck driver.6' The insur-
ance company refused to defend, claiming the truck was not
owned by the insured.68 The insured notified the insurer that the
case could be settled within policy limits but the company refused
to settle, and the final verdict was well above the face amount of
the policy.69 The question was whether the insurer could be
forced to pay the liability in excess of policy limits.'0
The court said an insurer has an implied duty of fair dealing
with its insured, which
requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate case al-
though the express terms of the policy do not impose
such a duty. The insurer, in deciding whether a claim
should be compromised, must take into account the in-
terest of the insured and give it at least as much consid-
eration as it does to its own interest .... When there is
great risk of recovery beyond the policy limits so that
the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is
a settlement which can be made within those limits, a
consideration in good faith of the insured's interest re-
quires the insurer to settle the claim. Its unwarranted
refusal to do so constitutes a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing."'
Henke v. Iowa Home Mutual Casualty Co. refined the insurer's
required calculation even further." The Henke court said that "if
an insurer acts in complete good faith as to all investigation and
negotiations concerning the catastrophe involved, it is not liable
for excess judgments above policy limits. "7 If the insurer acts in
bad faith, however, the trial court will have to submit the question
of recovery to the jury, because "[b] ad faith requires more than a
showing of inadvertence or honest mistake of judgment."74 The
court added this caveat:
The insurer must give equal consideration to the inter-
ests of the insured as it does its own interests, and the
failure to do so can be one element of bad faith. Re-
67. 328 P.2d 198, 198 (Cal. 1958).
68. Id. at 200.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 201.
72. 97 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 1959).
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jecting settlement proposals which the insurer [knows]
to be reasonable, and which [are] within the policy lim-
its, manifests bad faith towards the insured's inter-
est....
The insurer must not refuse to make a settlement,
if it knows that it has no more than an equal, or less
than 50-50, chance of winning the case and if the case is
lost the verdict against insured will without doubt ex-
ceed the policy limits, provided settlement can be made
within policy limits.
5
In Henke, several claims had been filed; the insurer had refused to
try individual settlements, wanting instead to pay the face amount
of the policy in a single case to save litigation costs. 7 6 The insurer
had to pay the full amount of the verdicts because its refusal to
settle the claims individually constituted bad faith.
77
In Lysick v. Walcom,"' the bad faith issue hit the lawyers in the
75. Id. at 173-74.
76. Id. at 171.
77. Id. at 177; see also American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. G.A. Nichols Co., 173
F.2d 830, 833 (10th Cir. 1949) (holding it was bad faith not to settle when highly
likely the verdict would exceed policy limits); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d
173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (finding that where lawyer had predicted $100,000 exposure
and verdict came in for $101,000, it was bad faith not to have settled for $10,000
face value of policy; awarding insured additional damages for her mental suffer-
ing); Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that where company offered nothing in settlement and damage exposure was
high, punitive damages were available for bad-faith failure to settle); Davy v. Public
Nat'l Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (explaining it was bad
faith for the insurer to gamble the insured's exposure to $19,000 excess judgment
against its chance to save $4500 if the jury found no liability); Ranger County Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1987) (imputing negligence of a lawyer
in failing to settle to the insurer); G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem.
Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929) (explaining that negligent fail-
ure to settle, not lack of good faith, is the standard).
But see Zieman Mfg. Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 1343,
1346 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding no liability for failure to settle within policy limits
where verdict came in at less than those limits); California Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Su-
perior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (permitting insurance
company to amend answer to allege affirmative defense of contributory bad faith);
Eklund v. Safeco Ins. Co., 579 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (finding no
bad faith where insurer had rejected a policy limits offer, when defense lawyer said
there was no likely liability and insured said he would cancel policy if the company
agreed to any settlement).
The law on this subject is discussed and analyzed in several law review arti-
cles. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, Should Advice of Counsel Constitute A Defense for In-
surer Bad Faith ?, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1447 (1994); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76
VA. L. REv. 1113 (1990).
78. 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
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pocketbook. Lysick was a wrongful death action.79 The policy lim-
its were $10,000.80 The plaintiff demanded the face amount of
the policy, but Allstate offered only $9500 which the plaintiff re-
fused." The plaintiff sued, asking for damages of $450,000 but
82
offering to accept $12,500. The insured's private lawyer de-
manded that Allstate accept the offer and pay $10,000, with the
insured paying the $2500 in excess of the policy limit.8
Allstate continued to offer only $9500, and the plaintiff con-
tinued to reject it.8* Later, Allstate authorized an offer of the full
$10,000 if "wise and expedient to do so," but said it would not pay
before trial.85 Finally, when Allstate offered the full $10,000, the
insured defendant was not able to pay the extra $2500.' 6 When
the case went to trial, the verdict came back for $225,000.87 Wal-
com, the lawyer retained to defend the insured, was sued for his
88conduct in failing to get the case settled .
The court held that the provision in the policy giving the in-
surer the right to defend claims normally constitutes consent to
have the insurer conduct the defense.89 The attorney, however,
nevertheless owes the insured "the same obligations of good faith
and fidelity as if [the insured] had retained the attorney person-
ally."90 Sometimes, conflicts may arise. They do not necessarily
mean the lawyer must withdraw, but "when an attorney attempts a
dual relationship without making the full disclosure required of
him, he is civilly liable to the client who suffers loss caused by lack
of disclosure."9 Lawyer Walcom would be liable for the jury ver-
dict in excess of the policy limit if his breach of duty were found
to be a proximate cause of the loss.9' Although the bad faith doc-





84. Lysick, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11.
85. Id. at411.
86. Id. at 412. The defendant was an estate, and the individual who had of-




90. Lysick, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
91. Id. at 414.
92. Id. at 418 (relying generally on Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962)). The traps for the unwary in this area have gen-
erated a group of cases that might be called the "bad-faith setup." Basically, the
[Vol. 23
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trine primarily relates to insurance company liability, any lawyer
who treats an insurance company as his or her client, rather than
treating the insured or both as clients, is taking a foolhardy risk.
B. Settlement of a Case Without the Insured's Consent
The flip side of failing to settle when the opportunity arises is
deciding to settle when the insured would prefer to fight. Some-
times settlements can do collateral damage to an insured, as when
a malpractice settlement hurts a doctor's reputation. On this is-
sue the insurance policy typically is clear; the insurer reserves to
itself the right to settle cases. This does not, however, always gov-
ern the lawyer's duty to the client, the insured.
In Rogers v. Robson, a doctor was sued for malpractice.93 His
malpractice insurer retained counsel to defend the action.94 Al-
though his policy did not give him a veto over settlements, the
doctor made clear to the law firm that he did not want the case
settled without his consent.95 The lawyer did settle, however, for
$1250.96 In the settlement agreement, the patient expressly de-
nied the doctor's liability.97
Nevertheless, the doctor filed an action against the lawyer for
wrongful settlement.98 The court agreed that the doctor's mal-
practice policy gave the insurance company the right to settle with-
plaintiff makes a policy limits offer with a very short window for acceptance before
the case is filed or at least before the defense team has had a chance to investigate.
The insured's bad-faith claim is then assigned to the plaintiff in exchange for a
covenant not to collect from the insured's personal assets. An insurer's early un-
willingness to settle without information about the incident or damages is then
cited as bad faith sufficient to make even small policies cover big losses. See, e.g.,
Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). The
courts seem to be catching on to the tactic and are resisting bad-faith entrapment
of the insurer. See, e.g., Matt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 798 F. Supp. 429, 434 (W.D.
Ky. 1991) (holding that insurer's demand that plaintiff reveal no-fault insurance
coverage before suit was filed did not constitute bad faith), aff'd, 968 F.2d 1215
(6th Cir. 1992); Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. 1994)
(holding that failure to settle for an early offer did not constitute negligence); see
also Stephen R. Schmidt, The Bad Faith Setup, 29 ToRT & INS. L.J. 705, 717 (1994)
(discussing the limits of imposing liability for bad faith).
93. Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 392 N.E.2d 1365,
1365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980).




98. Id. at 1368.
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out approval of the insured.9 The court said the duty of the law-
yerstill could be breached.'00 The insured is the client; the insurer
is merely the lawyer's employer. 0' The lawyer owes the insured
the same duties he or she would owe a client paying his or her
own bills.'0 2 When an opportunity for settlement arose, the lawyer
had a conflict.' He had to explain everything to both clients.0
The doctor might have lost coverage from a failure to cooperate
and to allow the insurer to settle, but those consequences would
have been the doctor's choice.
99. Rogers, 392 N.E.2d at 1370; accord Caplan v. Fellheimer, Eichen, Braver-
man & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1995) (allowing insurer to settle em-
ployment discrimination suit without approval of insured, even though such a set-
tlement precluded insured's future malicious prosecution claim); Feliberty v.
Damon, 527 N.E.2d 261, 262 (N.Y 1988) (holding that insurer had the absolute
right to settle claim according to the contract provisions); see alsoJon Epstein, An-
notation, Liability of Insurer to Insured for Settling Third-Party Claim Within Policy Limits
Resulting in Detriment to Insured, 18 A.L.R.5th 474, 482-524 (1994) (compiling deci-
sions regarding insurer's liability for damage to particular interests of insured re-
sulting from settlement).
100. Rogers, 392 N.E.2d at 1370-71.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1371.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1371-72. The Rogers decision was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme
Court. In its short opinion, the court said:
Although defendants were employed by the insurer, plaintiff, as well as
the insurer, was their client and was entitled to a full disclosure of the in-
tent to settle the litigation without his consent and contrary to his express
instructions. Defendants' duty to make such disclosure stemmed from
their attorney-client relationship with plaintiff and was not affected by
the extent of the insurer's authority to settle without plaintiff's consent.
Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 407 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Ill. 1980).
The Missouri Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion:
The obligations of an attorney to his client "are in no way abridged by the
fact that an insurer employs him to represent an insured." The attorney
owes the insured the same obligation of good faith and fidelity as if the
insured had retained the attorney personally and at his own expense.
Arana v. Koerner, 735 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Betts v. All-
state Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)). Failure to recognize
and clear the conflict between insurer and insured here was breach of his duty as
the doctor's lawyer, not as an agent of the insurance company. Id.; accord Lieber-
man v. Employers Ins., 419 A.2d 417, 425 (N.J. 1980) (representing insurer in set-
tlement agreement despite insured's legitimate objections breaches lawyer's duty
to insured). But see Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 202 (Ala. 1988) ("[Even
if] the insured objects to a settlement of a claim, the attorney is not thereby pre-
cluded from negotiating a settlement at the direction of the insurer where the in-
surer has, by the terms of the policy, the exclusive right to settle or compromise
claims against its insured."). ABA Formal Opinion 96-403 (Aug. 2, 1996) ad-
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V. THE SANCTITY OF COMMUNICATIONS
One of the central concerns of insurance companies seeking
co-client status with their insureds has been the attorney-client
privilege. Normally, if a lawyer tells a non-client about a commu-
nication with a client, the privilege is lost. If the communication
involves two co-clients, however, the privilege is preserved.
In Goldberg v. American Home Assurance Co., Goldberg, an at-
torney, and his law firm were sued by a client for damages sus-
tained by the client when the firm filed a false SEC registration
statement on the client's behalf.10 6 Goldberg answered the com-
plaint, using private counsel and making affirmative claims
against both the client and the law firm. 07 He asked the insurer
to provide him a defense lawyer and the insurer assigned Ber-
gadano to the matter.108 Bergadano made periodic reports to the
insurer without sending copies to Goldberg.10 9 The court found
no problem with that:
Inasmuch as Bergadano was acting as counsel not only
for plaintiff-insured but also for defendant-insurer in
defending the federal claim against plaintiff, it was only
natural that Bergadano provide periodic status reports
to the client paying his fee. Although the better prac-
tice might be to provide plaintiff with courtesy copies of
all of these communiques, there was no obligation to
do so.1 10
This same logic has made it possible for an insured to see
confidential communications about the case sent to the insurance
company by the lawyer. In E. W Henke v. Iowa Home Mutual Casu-
alty Co., the insured wanted documents to prove a bad-faith fail-
ure to settle.111 The company said the materials were privileged
and denied that the insured was the lawyer's client at all. 2 The
court stated: "The fact that another selects and pays an attorney
does not control the relationship of attorney-client .... When
with due knowledge one assents to the appearance in court of an
dressed these issues after this article had been set in type. It is basically consistent
with the analysis put forth here.
106. 439 N.Y.S.2d 2, 2 (N.Y App. Div. 1981).
107. Id. at 4.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
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attorney in his behalf, an attorney-client relationship must be pre-
sumed."1 13 The court found the lawyer represented two clients
and, thus, there was no privilege between them.1 The insured
could get the correspondence.
Defenders of the two-client model should not get too excited.
Co-client status is a sufficient but not a necessary way to preserve
the protection of the privilege. When confidentiality of the in-
sured's communications with the insurance company is impor-
tant, courts have consistently resisted the efforts of insurance
companies to access them.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Keller was a suit for declaratory judg-
ment to determine whether the insurer was liable on a policy be-
cause of the insured's breach of the duty to cooperate. The in-
sured reported to the insurer that he had been driving at the time
of an accident, but the insurance company's lawyer took a state-
113. Id.at923.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 927; see also Longo v. American Policyholders' Ins. Co., 436 A.2d 577
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981). The Longo court stated, "A lawyer so retained [by
the insurer] is duty bound to represent the insured with undivided fidelity. His
ethical obligation is in no sense diminished by reason of his relationship with the
insurer." 436 A.2d at 580. In Longo, the lawyer represented both insurer and in-
sured and could not subordinate the rights of one client to the other. Id. If the
interests were in conflict, the lawyer had a duty to resign. Id. Thus, the court as-
sumed the interests were coincident and there was nothing to fear from disclo-
sure. Id.
The opposite situation occurred in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Engels. the
insurer wanted to see a statement by the insured. 244 N.YS.2d 983, 984-85 (N.Y
Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 250 N.YS.2d 851 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964). The court approved
the insurer's request, again citing the co-client exception to the privilege. Id. Fur-
ther, to permit the insured to make conflicting statements would be to let the
privilege be used "as a sword and not as a shield, a use not condoned by the
courts." Id. at 986.
Some courts have taken a different approach. In American Mutual Liability
Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, the court stated that "the attorney has two clients
whose primary, overlapping and common interest is the speedy and successful
resolution of the claim and litigation." 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 576 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974). The trio is "a loose partnership, coalition or alliance directed toward a
common goal." Id. Communications between them and the lawyer are thus privi-
leged. Id. However, "there is a sense in which each is independent of the other."
Id. at 572. It may be that the lawyer may tell the insurer in confidence some things
he wouldn't tell the insured - for example, what kind of witness he will make. Id.
at 572-73. "Similarly there may be confidences indulged by the insured to the at-
torney which in turn are not intended for the insurer." Id. at 572; see also State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375-76 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (stating that insured who had Cumis counsel was not entitled to see com-
munications between insurance adjuster and insurer).
116. 149 N.E.2d 482, 482 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958).
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ment from the insured, in which he admitted he had not been
the driver."7 The lawyer took the statement to support the in-
surer's effort to assert the policy defense." 8 The court acknowl-
edged that an insurer must depend on the veracity of an insured's
report and that the cooperation clause serves a public purpose.19
Nonetheless, the court stated, "[w]here an insurer's attorney has
reason to believe that the discharge of his duties to his client, the
insured, will conflict with his duties to his employer, the in-
surer,... it becomes incumbent upon [the lawyer] to terminate
his relationship with the client."2 The lawyer's misconduct was
imputed to the insurer, and the insurer could not avoid liability.2'
117. Id. at 483.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 484-85.
120. Id. at 486.
121. Id. In an effort to guide lawyers in their dealings with the confidential
information of insurers and insureds, in 1970 the ABA National Conference of
Lawyers and Liability Insurers drafted what came to be called the "Guiding Princi-
ples," a portion of which are shown here:
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST GENERALLY- DUTIES OF
ATTORNEY.
In any claim or in any suit where the attorney selected by the company to
defend the claim or action becomes aware of facts or information which
indicate to him a question of coverage in the matter being defended or
any other conflict of interest between the company and the insured with
respect to the defense of the matter, the attorney should promptly inform
both the company and the insured, preferably in writing, of the nature
and extent of the conflicting interest. In any such suit, the company or
its attorney should invite the insured to retain his own counsel at his own
expense to represent his separate interest.
V. CONTINUATION BYATTORNEY EVEN THOUGH THERE ISA
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS.
Where there is a question of coverage or other conflict of interest, the
company and the attorney selected by the company to defend the claim
or suit should not thereafter continue to defend the insured in the mat-
ter in question unless, after a full explanation of the coverage question,
the insured acquiesces in the continuation of such defense....
VI. DUTY OF ATTORNEY NOT TO DISCLOSE CERTAIN FACTS AND
INFORMATION.
Where the attorney selected by the company to defend a claim or suit be-
comes aware of facts or information, imparted to him by the insured un-
der circumstances indicating the insured's belief that such disclosure
would not be revealed to the insurance company but would be treated as
a confidential communication to the attorney, which indicate to the at-
torney a lack of coverage, then as to such matters, disclosures made di-
rectly to the attorney should not be revealed to the company by the at-
torney nor should the attorney discuss with the insured the legal
significance of the disclosure or the nature of the coverage question.
ABA National Conference of Lawyers & Liability Insurers, Guiding Principles, 20
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Moreover, the insurer had waived the breached cooperation
clause by waiting one and one-half years after the false report to
complain. 1
Similarly, in Parsons v. Continental National American Group, the
insured's son had assaulted a neighbor child. 12  It appeared the
son had not acted intentionally, and the insurance company was
prepared to take its adjuster's advice to settle. 124 When counsel
was assigned to take over the defense, however, he obtained a
confidential psychological file on the son and learned that the at-
tack probably was intentional.125 This additional information led
to a reservation of rights letter. The lawyer later interviewed the
son and got a statement from him admitting willfulness.
12
1
The court did not defend insurance fraud, but said, "The at-
torney in the instant case should have notified CNA that he could
no longer represent them when he obtained any information (as
a result of his attorney-client relationship with [the insured's
son]) that could possibly be detrimental to [the son's] interests
FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 95 (1970); see also Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d
552 (Tex. 1973). Tilley was a suit for declaratory judgment as to whether late no-
tice of an accident relieved the insurer of its obligation to defend. 496 S.W.2d at
554. Employers had retained a lawyer to defend Tilley, and he had done so for
one and one-half years, but at the same time he was gathering information to show
that Tilley had indeed known of the accident earlier than when suit was filed and
thus could have notified the carrier. See id. The lawyer never told Tilley of this
work for the carrier. Id. The policy provided that the lawyer was to be "selected,
employed and paid" by the carrier. Id. at 558. However,
such attorney becomes the attorney of record and the legal representa-
tive of the insured, and as such he owes the insured the same type of un-
qualified loyalty as if he had been originally employed by the insured. If
a conflict arises between the interests of the insurer and the insured, the
attorney owes a duty to the insured to immediately advise him of the con-
flict.
Id. at 558-59 (relying on the "Guiding Principles" as the public policy of Texas;
concluding that the principles are not changed by the reservation of rights issued
by the insurer here). "An attorney employed by an insurer to represent the in-
sured simply cannot take up the cudgels of the insurer against the insured .. "
Id. at 560. The insurer could and should have developed the evidence as to cover-
age through other agents, investigators, or lawyers, not the one assigned to repre-
sent Tilley. Id. at 560-61. Thus, the insurer was estopped from denying coverage.
Id.
122. Keller, 149 N.E.2d at 486.
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under the coverage of the policy.' 12 8 When a lawyer uses his confi-
dential relationship with the insured to gather evidence for the
insurer, allowing it to deny coverage under the policy, the insurer
is estopped from disclaiming liability under the policy.129 The in-
surance company was liable for the full $50,000 judgment.
3 0
Again, calling the insurance company a co-client of the in-
sured can lead the lawyer, and the insurance company, astray.
Calling the insurer an agent of the insured for communication
with counsel would be sufficient to protect as privileged those
communications that are necessary and in the interest of both the
insurer and the insured. The cases are clear: the insured is the
only client in any relevant sense.
VI. THE RIGHT TO SUE FOR MALPRACTICE
The final issue is what happens if the lawyer commits mal-
practice. The traditional view long has been that only a client
may sue for malpractice. Yet in a case where the result of the
malpractice is a judgment paid by the insurer, it might seem that
no one could call the lawyer to account.
In some cases the insured will have a personal right to dam-
ages for the malpractice. In Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, for example,
a passenger was hurt riding in a taxicab. 13 The passenger sued
the taxicab company, and the company referred the matter to its
insurance company, which was obligated to defend. 32 Clarke was
retained to handle the case. He secured an extension of time
to answer, but he sent the file back when the insurer did not send
him a retainer fee. 1 4 He misdirected a copy of his letter to an-
128. Id. at98.
129. Parsons, 550 P.2d at 99.
130. Id. at 100; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 949 (1966) (stating where the lawyer learns of a factual basis for a
failure to cooperate while representing the insured, he or she may not disclose
that factual basis to the insurer). But see Lockhart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 579 P.2d
1120, 1123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (claiming insurer may use against insured a
statement that when given was intended to be self-serving); Shafer v. Utica Mut.
Ins. Co., 289 N.Y.S. 577, 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936) (holding that a lawyer who rep-
resented both insured and insurer is not obliged to keep the insured's statement
from the insurer or to fail to use it against insured; stating that the privilege may
be used as a shield but not a sword).
131. 270 A.2d 662, 663 (Md. 1970).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 663-64.
134. Id. at 664.
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other company, so even the insured, which was in receivership,
did not know what was happening with the case. 3 5' The plaintiff
ultimately accepted a default judgment the insured was required
to pay, so the insured sued its lawyer, Clarke, for malpractice. 6
The question was whether a lawyer-client relationship had
been established by the insurer's sending him the file.1 The
court said that when a liability insurer obtains counsel to defend
the insured, counsel "represents the insured as well as the insur-
ance carrier[,] and the attorney-client relationship is thus estab-
lished between the insured and the attorney selected for the in-
sured by the insurance company.'' 3s Thus, Clarke should have
known he had to notify the insured when he terminated the rep
resentation, and he was the one who misdirected the letter.
The court found a lawyer-client relationship with the insured for
purposes of a suit for malpractice.
The more difficult question is whether the insurance carrier
also has a right to sue for malpractice. The Restatement indicates
yes, relying on what might be called a third-party beneficiary the-
ory. Courts often have rejected the theory,14 ' but this may be
changing. In Atlanta International Insurance Co. v. Bell a worker
had fallen to his death in a hole on ajob site. Atlanta Interna-
tional, which insured the security service that guarded the prem-
135. Id. at 665.
136. Id.
137. Central Cab, 270 A.2d at 666.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 667; see also Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984). Malpractice action in California is more tort than contract. See
Purdy, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 533. "In the case at bench, however, there were in fact two
clients, the insurance carrier and the insured .... The attorney's primary duty has
been said to be to further the best interests of the insured." Id. And the insured
may have a cause of action against the insurance company for the malpractice of
the lawyer. See id. at 534. But see Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608
P.2d 281, 293 (Alaska 1980) (contending that negligent failure to settle within pol-
icy limits falls short of bad faith).
141. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDonald, Hecht & Solberg, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 424, 426-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that a legal malpractice action is
personal and cannot be assigned) (citingJackson v. Rogers & Wells, 258 Cal. Rptr.
454, 462 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Goodley v. Wank & Wank, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87-88
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); and Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle, 268 Cal. Rptr. 637,
639-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)). Assignment allegedly would commercialize claims
and make lawyers defend themselves when they owed no duty to the plaintiff. See
Kracht, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
142. 475 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Mich. 1991).
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ises, retained the Bell law firm to provide the defense. 4  The firm
filed an answer but failed to plead comparative negligence as a
defense.'" Atlanta had to pay a higher judgment than it should
have had to pay, so it sued the lawyers for legal malpractice. 45
The court started from the position that a lawyer is liable for
malpractice only to a client.146 Allowing third-party liability could
create conflicts of interest and discourage a lawyer's full represen-
tation of a client. 47 The court added, "The relationship between
the insurer and the retained defense counsel, while less than a
client-attorney relationship, unquestionably differs from the rela-
tionship between a defense counsel and a party-opponent."'
48
The lawyer even has fiduciary obligations to the insurance com-
pany. Furthermore, only the insurer has any real incentive to sue
for malpractice.'4 9
The interests of insurer and insured can differ, and the court
made clear that "the defense attorney's primary duty of loyalty lies
with the insured, and not the insurer.""5° An equitable subroga-
tion theory of the insurance company's recovery avoids all conflict
of interest when it comes to suing for malpractice.1'i Thus, the
insurance company in Bell was permitted to stand in the shoes of








148. Bell, 475 N.W.2d at 297.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 298.
152. Id. at 298-99. Justice Cavanagh, writing for the three dissenting justices,
stated that at the outset of most representations, there is a community of interests
of insurer and insured. Id. at 301. The "special relationship" between attorney,
insurer and insured arises from the consent of the insured. Id.
The reason ... for allowing the attorney to make disclosures to the insur-
ance carrier is not that there is an attorney-client relationship between
the insurer and the attorney, but that the client waives this confidentiality
with regard to the insurance carrier and agrees to cooperate in the de-
fense of a claim upon signing the contract of insurance. Thus, it is the
insurance contract that creates a special relationship between the attor-
ney, the insured, and the insurer. This unique relationship, however,
does not rise to the status of an attorney-client relationship.
Id. The insurer really only pays the lawyer's fee. Id. Allowing equitable subroga-
tion, the dissenters feared, could "substantially impair an attorney's ability to make
1997]
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Unigard Insurance Group v. O'Flaherty & Belgum reached a simi-
lar result with a more direct theory. Hunn sued Wilkinson for
injuries sustained at work.5 4 The answer did not allege worker's
compensation as the exclusive remedy or claim a right of set-off.155
Unigard had to pay policy limits to avoid the insured's facin an
even largerjudgment. 5 6 Unigard sued O'Flaherty, the lawyer.
The court held that a lawyer "owes a duty of care to the in-
surer[,] which will support its independent right to bring a legal
malpractice action against the attorney for negligent acts commit-ted n th reresetatin . ,,15s
ted in the representation of the insured. The right was not
based on equitable subrogation.9 Allowing such suits, based on a
breach of duty, provides redress to the party suffering the loss
without undercutting the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the insured.
60
VII. CONCLUSION
When all is said and done, asking whether a lawyer retained
by an insurance company represents one client or two probably is
not worth the ink spent on it. Clearly, more judicial opinions
have used two-client language than one-client, but when the
characterization makes a difference, the insured has been the
only client worth the name.
The insurance industry may complain that the one-client ap-
decisions that require a choice between the best interests of the insurer and the
best interests of the insured." Id. at 304.
153. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
154. Id. at 566.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 567.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 568.
159. Unigard Ins., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 568. Nor was the insurer's right to sue
based on the relationship with Cumis counsel, as in Assurance Co. of America v. Ha-
ven. See 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 31-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (stating insurer can sue
Cumis counsel for failure to keep the insurer informed, but not for malpractice in
failure to assert defenses; insurer has its own counsel in such cases with full rights
to participate in defense); see also Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549, 551-52 (Pa.
Super. Ct.) (permitting insured to assign the malpractice action against the lawyer
to the plaintiff in satisfaction ofjudgment), appeal denied, 670 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1995);
cf. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir.
1994) (permitting excess insurer to sue primary insurer for failure to settle within
primary insurance limits).
160. See Unigard Ins., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 568-69 (citing Home Indem. Co. v.
Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 E3d 1322, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1994)) (acknowledging
the existence of an attorney-client relationship between an insurer and counsel
hired to represent the insured).
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proach renders insurance companies second-class citizens, but if
they strip away the rhetoric, surely they must see that to act as
though the insured is not the only client will almost inevitably in-
volve them in a claim of bad faith that will be a very expensive
balm for their pride. On the other hand, the lawyer who thinks
of the insured as the client and the insurer as the third party pay-
ing the bill will not be led astray."'
161. The first proposed final draft of the Restatement tried to convey that accurate
message. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 215.
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